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This paper investigates subjective agency (SA) as a special type of efficacious action
consciousness. Our central claims are, firstly, that SA is a conscious act of voluntarily
initiating bodily motion. Secondly, we argue that SA is a case of multifunctional integration
of behavioral functions being analogous to multisensory integration of sensory modalities.
This is based on new perspectives on the initiation of action opened up by recent
advancements in robot assisted neuro-rehabilitation which depends on the active
participation of the patient and yields experimental evidence that there is SA in terms
of a conscious act of voluntarily initiating bodily motion (phenomenal performance).
Conventionally, action consciousness has been considered as a sense of agency (SoA).
According to this view, the conscious subject merely echoes motor performance and
does not cause bodily motion. Depending on sensory input, SoA is implemented by
means of unifunctional integration (binding) and inevitably results in non-efficacious action
consciousness. In contrast, SA comes as a phenomenal performance which causes
motion and builds on multifunctional integration. Therefore, the common conception
of the brain should be shifted toward multifunctional integration in order to allow for
efficacious action consciousness. For this purpose, we suggest the heterarchic principle
of asymmetric reciprocity and neural operators underlying SA. The general idea is that
multifunctional integration allows conscious acts to be simultaneously implemented
with motor behavior so that the resulting behavior (SA) comes as efficacious action
consciousness. Regarding the neural implementation, multifunctional integration rather
relies on operators than on modular functions. A robotic case study and possible
experimental setups with testable hypotheses building on SA are presented.
Keywords: subjectivity, agency (psychology), motion, multimodality, multifunctionality, neurorehabilitation,
assistive robotics
1. Introduction
The concept of multisensory (multimodal) integration emerged as an alternative approach to
the problem of sensory integration, i.e., how different sensory modalities interact in order to
form coherent representations of objects or processes underlying sensory input. According to
the standard view, sensory modalities are processed independently in their respective brain areas
and later on integrated by means of binding. As this kind of integration depends on single
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modalities the standard approach can be referred to as unimodal
integration or just binding. By postulating multisensory neurons,
this standard view has been challenged (Calvert and Thesen,
2004, Alais et al., 2010). Multimodality implies that there is no
one-to-one mapping of sensory input to a certain brain area.
Instead, different sensory modalities can be processed by one
and the same area so that integration already takes place at
the primary level of sensory processing. This new perspective,
referred to as multimodal (multisensory) integration, contains
farreaching implications for the functional organization of the
brain as well as for the cognitive and phenomenal (conscious)
aspects of sensory processing and action control (Musseler et al.,
2014).
While unimodal and multimodal integration are usually
concerned with the processing of sensory input and perceptual
consciousness, an analogous point for shifting from a unimodal
to a multimodal setup can be made in the case of action
consciousness. As action consciousness mainly builds on
behavioral functions of action initiation and control, the
uni-/multimodal-distinction turns into the distinction between
unifunctional and multifunctional integration of behavioral
functions. Unifunctional integration (binding) is mainly applied
in order to explain the phenomenal experience of action
consciousness in terms of a sense of agency (SoA), authorship,
or control (Gallagher, 2000, Gallagher, 2012)1. According to
SoA as an experiential concept, current phenomenology of
action as well as psychological and neurocognitive research on
action do not leave any space for bodily motion being initiated
by the conscious agent. Even if voluntary initiation is well-
known in neuroscientific research on motion, the question “Does
Consciousness Cause Behavior?” (Pockett et al., 2006) tends to
be negatively answered. While initiation is usually left to the
locomotor system, the conscious agent is limited to experiencing
action post-hoc. Therefore, the conscious subject merely echoes
motor performance (Haggard and Johnson, 2003) and is not
regarded to be an efficacious agent who causes bodily motion
(Bayne and Levy, 2009). In this view, action consciousness is
an epiphenomenal addition to sub-personal processes of the
locomotor system.
Opposed to this common view, robot-assisted rehabilitation
(Tejima, 2001, Feil-Seifer and Mataric, 2005) opens up a new
perspective on the phenomenology of action. The rehabilitative
application of robotic devices which crucially depend on the
active participation of the patient (Hogan et al., 2006, Duschau-
Wicke et al., 2010), yields experimental evidence that there
is action consciousness prior to conducted motion. There is
subjective agency (SA) in terms of a conscious and therefore
subjective act of voluntarily initiating bodily motion (Zhu, 2004,
Kawamoto et al., 2010). “Subjective” concerns the individual
conception of reality. An agent is subjective if her behavior is
not completely predefined in terms of its task-orientation and
(functionally defined) course of action (Grüneberg and Suzuki,
2014). In this view, action consciousness is a particular instance
of subjective in terms of autonomous behavior. Accordingly,
1If not otherwise specified, we will subsume the different senses related to action
(sense of agency, ownership, intention, control etc.) to the sense of agency (SoA).
“voluntary” here means that the human agent initiated the
motion of her body based on her (spontaneous) decision and
regardless whether there has been a previous external stimulus
provoking a reflex or any internal constraint like Libet’s urge.
It is also irrelevant whether motion actually occurs as SA’s
efficacy concerns the release of a controlling neural signal (motor
program) which may or may not result in bodily motion.
Conceding that robotic research serves as a source for
investigating human cognition and behavior (Oudeyer, 2010,
Morse et al., 2011), we use robotic experiments for identifying
SA2. While action in general is a long-known candidate for
integrating differentmodalities (Gallese, 2000), SA—compared to
SoA—suggests a basically different type of action consciousness
which in turn asks for a different explanation. In the same way
as the multimodal approach suggests intersensory integration at
the basic neuronal level of sensory processing, we suggest that
interfunctional integration already occurs at the basic neuronal
level of action initiation. Accordingly, our focus lies on the
functional organization of action consciousness which allows
SA as efficacious action consciousness. Following this approach,
this paper aims at revealing a substantial constituent of action
consciousness and at suggesting an explanation for SA as a case
of multifunctional integration.
The remainder of this paper is divided into two parts.
Section 2 and 3 identify SA as a distinct type of efficacious
action consciousness. Section 4 and 5 investigate SA as a
case of multifunctional integration and present experimental
evidence as well as hypotheses based on SA. Because SA as an
efficacious capacity is usually not regarded as a feature of action
consciousness, we will first identify SA. For this purpose, we
introduce robotic neurorehabilitation and in particular focus on
the patient’s role in the therapeutic process (Section 2.1). By
means of analyzing the implementation and effects of robotic
neurorehabilitation, we argue that SA is efficacious in terms of
voluntary initiation of motor programs (Section 2.2). Then we
show that SA does not fall under common action consciousness
(SoA). Due to the experiential stance of SoA (Section 3.1)
and the corresponding functional organization (unifunctional
integration), SoA does not capture SA as a conscious and at the
same time efficacious capacity (Section 3.2). The identification
of SA and its exclusion from common action consciousness
lead to the conclusion that SA comes as a distinct type of the
phenomenology of action and is classified as a phenomenal
performance (Section 3.3). Based on this finding, we argue that
the brain must be able to implement SA (Section 4.1) and present
a functional organization (multifunctional integration) which
allows for SA as efficacious action consciousness (Section 4.2).
Finally, we illustrate SA by means of a case study of a robotic
device for lower limb rehabilitation (Section 5.1). Hypotheses
regarding neurorehabilitation and athletic sport are suggested
which promise to gain insight into the link between SA and its
implementation in motor behavior together with the detection of
effects of neurorehabilitation (Section 5.2).
2Legrand also uses the concept of “subjective agency” for the pre-reflective
condition of phenomenal experience (Legrand, 2007) and thereby remains within
the common understanding of agentive as experiential consciousness. In turn, we
relate SA to the agent’s capacity to initiate action voluntarily and consciously.
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2. Subjective Agency in the Course of
Robotic Neurorehabilitation
In recent years, exoskeleton robots have been developed for
the rehabilitation of impairments of upper and lower limbs.
Traditional physiotherapy follows a bottom-up approach
in terms of acting on the (distal) physical level in order to
influence the neural system. In comparison, robotic devices
build on therapeutic top-down control for the purpose
of neurorehabilitation (Belda-Lois et al., 2011). Hereby,
neurorehabilitation depends on the state of the brain after
a stroke or other damage and not on the physical level of
the impaired limbs. In order to exploit neuroplasticity for
rehabilitative purposes and motor learning, the patient’s
voluntary involvement in the therapeutic process is essential
(Hogan et al., 2006) similar to cognitive-behavioral therapywhere
therapeutic effects also depend on the conscious modification
of thought or behavior by the patient herself (Brewin, 1996;
McKay et al., 2015). Therefore, robotic rehabilitation devices for
upper (Maciejasz et al., 2014 for an overview) and lower limbs
(Daz et al., 2011 for an overview) enable the patient to move her
impaired limbs voluntarily despite the impairment.
2.1. From Being Moved to Voluntary Initiation:
Device Control by Biosignals
The standard electromechanical approach to exoskeleton robots
consists mainly of replacing motion support delivered by a
physiotherapist. It is the task of an exoskeleton robot to move a
limb according to a predetermined kinematic trajectory; thereby
the patient makes use of the autonomous motion generated by
the robot (Belda-Lois et al., 2011). Thus, the patient is being
moved. Accordingly, purely mechanically based exoskeleton
robots do not fully utilize a top-down approach by making
use of remaining brain capacities and increasing the patient’s
involvement in motion generation because they do not consider
the patient’s intention to move her limbs voluntarily. Motion
support remains passive as a purely mechanical and automated
process closer to common physiotherapeutic support.
In order to increase the patient’s participation, the control
strategy of the robotic device has to be extended for
implementing active support. Instead of letting the robot
execute predetermined kinematic patterns, biosignals of patients
can be exploited for the control of the robotic device
(de Almeida Ribeiro et al., 2013). As especially EMG signals of
neural muscle activity can be detected even in patients with severe
impairments, these signals can be used to interpret the patient’s
intention to move, i.e., for human intention estimation (Suzuki
et al., 2007). Thus, the patient is no longer being passively moved
by the robotic device, but is enabled to control the robot directly
by her capacity to voluntarily initiate bodily motion. Motion
support is delivered according to the patient’s needs3.
3Numerous examples for upper limb devices depending on biosignals or
mechanical control can be found in Maciejasz et al. (2014); for an example of a
lower limb device building on biosignal processing see Section 5.1.
2.2. Closing the Proprioceptive Loop
The obvious reason for arguing for SA lies in the therapeutic
effects achieved by devices using biosignals (Kawamoto et al.,
2013, Maciejasz et al., 2014). Lacking a decisive neuroscientific
explanation for these effects, the following hypothesis might
serve as a starting point to understand the implementation and
effects of robotic neurorehabilitation: Depending on SA, robotic
devices allow for the closing of the proprioceptive loop (Kawamoto
et al., 2013) of physical interaction between the efferent active
neural signal and the afferent signal of consequential sensation
of the intended motion and thereby enhance neurorehabilitation
in that the brain detects successful initiation and execution of
motion despite of the impairment. According to this hypothesis,
the therapeutic effects of a recovery of motivity and the
underlying recovery of the corresponding brain regions are
derived as follows (cf. Figure 1; for the sake of simplicity,
we will illustrate the hypothesis by lower limb rehabilitation
of forward gait which could be replaced by any other
limb):
0 In case of locomotively impaired patients, there is no
automatic (sub-personal) initiation of forward walking as the
neural signals are not sufficient in order to activate the leg
muscles. The patient remains in a resting position when no
therapeutic actions are taken.
1 After being equipped with an exoskeleton robot, the patient
voluntarily initiates forward walking (SA), i.e., consciously
issues the command to move.
FIGURE 1 | SA initiating the proprioceptive loop. Based on “SA of forward
walking” (1), an efferent active neural signal of the intended motion is released
(2). The robotic device (in this example a lower-limb exoskeleton robot) detects
the signal and supports the execution of leg movement (3) so that an afferent
signal of consequential sensation goes back to the brain and signals that a
motion has been executed successfully despite of the impairment (4). The
closed proprioceptive loop of physical interaction (5) is supposed to enhance
neurorehabilitation of the brain. Contrary to locating SA in the brain, conscious
acts are regarded here as acts of the entire agent comprising the central
nervous system as well as the actuators.
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2 The neural activity of motor commands issued by the patient
can be detected in the leg muscles: there is an efferent active
neural signal.
3 The exoskeleton detects this signal by its EMG sensors
and launches its motion support: actual walking motion is
executed.
4 Due to the execution of a walking motion, an afferent signal
of consequential sensation goes back to the brain and signals
that a motion has been executed successfully.
5 The proprioceptive loop is closed. The brain regions
responsible for motion control can chalk up a successful
motion and remain active or become (partially) restored4.
The key assumption in this hypothetical sequence of the
therapeutic process concerns the recovery of the brain regions
responsible for motion control by means of closing the
proprioceptive loop of efferent and afferent neural signals. Even if
current research does not yield a final neuroscientific explanation
for this effect, two findings are nevertheless obvious: Following
(0), there is no automatic (sub-personal) initiation of motion
in the therapeutic setting. This means that the sub-personal
mechanisms of the locomotor system, which are usually held
responsible for motion initiation (Haggard, 2005, Frith, 2013),
no longer provide sufficient resources to initiate bodily motion
automatically. The result is the obvious impairment of the patient
and her corresponding inability to move her body. Thus, firstly,
in the case of patients with locomotive impairment there is no sub-
personal (automatic) initiation of motion as the brain and/or the
spinal cord are impaired to the extent that control and initiation of
motion are no longer available automatically.
Limited knowledge about neurorehabilitation does not
challenge the clinical evidence (cf. Section 5.1) that there
are significant therapeutic effects by robotic rehabilitation. So
following (1) and (2), robotic therapy shows that there is a certain
conscious and efficacious capacity of SA in order to voluntarily
initiate motion. This finding can be directly concluded from the
fact that the rehabilitation robot is only operated if the patient
voluntarily (consciously) seeks to walk forward (Hogan et al.,
2006, Eitam et al., 2013)5. If the patient does not voluntarily
engage in the therapeutic process, nothing will happen (as
stated above) and the patient’s condition might even deteriorate.
Accordingly, the initiation of the proprioceptive loop by means
of the efferent active neural signal depends on the voluntary
initiation by the patient. Regarding the motor-related objective of
the initiation, behavioral research suggests that cognitive action
control concerns the synergetic level of bodily motion (Latash
et al., 2007). Voluntary motor programs identified by Ivanenko
et al. are possible candidates to implement initiated motion
physically (Ivanenko et al., 2004, Lacquaniti et al., 2012). They
suggest five basic locomotion motor programs for gait which are
possibly superimposed by voluntary motor programs depending
4For current purposes, the fact is crucial that the patient’s ability to move is
(partially) restored whereas it exceeds the scope of this paper to specify which
brain regions in particular are affected. For further considerations of the neural
implementation of SA cf. Section 4.2.
5The patient’s capacity of SA can be generalized to healthy subjects as healthy
subjects are also capable of a particularly active engagement in physical motion
which exceeds automatic motion (Haggard and Johnson, 2003).
on the subject’s control6. Thesemotor programs are released even
if no actual motion occurs. Thus, secondly, SA is efficacious in
terms of voluntary initiation of motor programs.
3. Unifunctional Integration and the Sense
of Agency
In general, conscious experience is supposed to form a particular
and rather problematic case of unimodal integration as the
coherence of objects and the phenomenal homogeneity of
experience ask for a relatively high degree of integration. The
same counts for motor behavior and is here referred to as
unifunctional integration: Basic functions of motor behavior
are integrated (bound) in order to make certain aspects of
motor behavior contents of phenomenal experience. Action
consciousness is usually spelled out in terms of SoA which
forms a result of unifunctional integration. After a brief look
at the common phenomenology of action and the underlying
experiential stance toward agency (Section 3.1), we will turn to
Pacherie (2008) as she links a strong phenomenology of action
with its neural implementation. In particular, we examine how
Pacherie draws on binding in order to explain SoA. It can be
shown by means of the functional organization of SoA that
unifunctional approaches to action consciousness such as SoA
inevitably lead to post-hoc (experiential) action consciousness
and therefore do not capture SA as an efficacious capacity
(Section 3.2). Finally, the identification of SA (cf. Section 2)
and its exclusion from common action consciousness (Section
3.2) lead to the conclusion that SA comes as a distinct type
of the phenomenology of action which will be classified as a
phenomenal performance (Section 3.3).
3.1. Senses and Experiences: the Experiential
Stance Toward Agency
The phenomenology of action is usually regarded as thin and
evasive to the extent that its phenomenal content cannot be
identified clearly (Metzinger, 2006). However, there is a degree
of consensus about how to capture the phenomenology of action
in terms of SoA. According to the basic definition provided
by Gallagher, SoA is the sense that I am the one who is
causing or generating an action, and comprises multiple aspects
ranging from first-order experience linked to intentional aspects
and bodily movements to second-order reflective attribution
(Gallagher, 2007). Further conceptual refinement led to the
distinction of a feeling of agency and a judgment of agency
as different levels of SoA (Synofzik et al., 2008) and the
framework of optimal cue integration building on prediction and
postdiction (Synofzik et al., 2013)7. Based on the phenomenal
6Here we skip the question whether voluntary initiation refers to one motor
program or possibly a complex of motor programs in order to initiate bodily
motion.
7See David et al. (2008) for an overview of different accounts on SoA,
distinguishing between the comparator model, simulation theory, intentional
binding, and the multifactorial two-step account. Regarding gait, Kannape and
Blanke argue that the central monitoring framework (comparator model) suffices
for gait agency despite certain necessary refinements in case of gait as a whole body
motion (Kannape and Blanke, 2012).
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states associated with agency, experience of a movement can take
different shapes, such as an action (of one’s own), an action that
one is of control of, an action that one is performingwith a certain
degree of effort, or an action that one is performing freely (Bayne,
2008).
All these approaches share the common ground that SoA
is a phenomenal echo of sub-personal motor processes, i.e.,
“Awareness is a delayed and attenuated version of motor
performance.” (Haggard and Johnson, 2003, p. 81). Even if
Haggard and Johnson stress the aspect that the phenomenology
of action becomes more accessible during tasks which ask for
active engagement of the agent, such as rehabilitation or motor
learning and recreational activity, their far-reaching observation
is not further elaborated. Common approaches to SoA and the
phenomenology of action in general still take an experiential
stance toward agency (Horgan et al., 2003, Bayne, 2008) which
binds any phenomenally present agency to the dimension of
perceptual experience. This experiential stance toward agency
depends on the common triadic structure of (1) a subject of
experience, i.e., the agent, (2) the experiential content, i.e., the
phenomenal state of an action, which depends on (3) the object
of experience, i.e., (aspects of) the physical movement. As will be
shown by means of analyzing the functional organization of SoA,
this experiential stance and the dependency of the state (2) on
the object (3) inevitably renders agency a post-hoc phenomenon
of sub-personal motor processes so that agentive experience
in terms of SoA falls under an experiential caveat and is not
supposed to play any efficacious role (Bayne and Levy, 2009).
3.2. Binding: Making Subjective Agency
Impossible
In the following, we will analyze the functional organization
of SoA within Pacherie’s model (cf. Table 1). Beginning with a
brief presentation of Pacherie’s framework (Section 3.2.1), we will
then focus on the organizational principle, the implementation
of behavioral functions and the resulting type of consciousness
(Section 3.2.2; cf. Table 1). This analysis will clarify why
efficacious action consciousness is generally made impossible by
unifunctional integration.
3.2.1. Pacherie’s Approach to the Sense of Agency
Despite the fact that SA forms a cornerstone of folk psychology
(Malle, 2004) and the organization of societal life in general, Libet
set off the latest avalanche which seeks to explain any action
consciousness as an epiphenomenal consequence of locomotor
processing (Libet et al., 1983). Following corresponding accounts
of the brain, action consciousness is captured by experiential
(post-hoc) SoA and epiphenomenally attached to sub-personal
processes in the brain (Flohr, 1991, Metzinger, 2003).
In light of this development, Pacherie’s approach is insofar
of interest as she generally argues for conscious agency and
considers processes of action initiation and control that not only
represent goals or executed actions, but more actively organize
and structure motor processes (Pacherie, 2014). This position
possibly leads a way to SA. Yet on the other hand, she proposes
a complex model which attributes SoA to a cybernetic model of
action specification (Pacherie, 2008, also Kumar and Srinivasan,
2012 drawing on Clark, 2013). It is exactly this latter model which
renders conscious agency, as Pacherie proposes, impossible.
Regarding the aetiology of agentive experiences, Pacherie goes for
a comparator-based approach according to which bodily action
is initiated and controlled by inverse and forward models in a
central monitoring framework (Frith et al., 2000) which basically
follows a cybernetic setup of control mechanisms (Wolpert,
1997).
The comparator model serves to instantiate a dynamical
model of intentions consisting of three hierarchical levels from
distal D-intentions down to proximal P-intentions and motoric
M-intentions (Pacherie, 2008). D-intentions consist of beliefs
and desires and therefore concern the overall decision-making
and rational control of bodily actions. P-intentions form a
link between the rational level of D-intentions and motoric
implementation. They integrate D-intentions and the situational
constraints of a particular action (situational anchoring) and
control the execution of an action. Finally,M-intentions concern
the selection of motor-programs and serve for basic motor
control. Based on this model, Pacherie breaks SoA down into the
sense of intentional causation, the sense of initiation and the sense
of control. These phenomenal agentive experiences of SoA are
explained by attributing them to the neural processes underlying
D-, P- and M-intentions.
3.2.2. Hierarchical Binding and Phenomenal
Counterparts
The standard account of unimodal integration (binding) builds
on temporal synchrony. According to von der Malsburg and
his correlation theory (von der Malsburg, 1994), neurons which
process input of the same sensory object, are supposed to fire
in temporal synchrony8. By means of roughly simultaneous
fire rates, (populations of) neurons which relate to one and
the same stimulus, synchronize even if the neurons are located
in rather distant areas of the brain. Every external object
can therefore evoke a certain representational pattern in the
brain, a so-called assembly. These assemblies are supposed to
bring about the homogeneous phenomenal consciousness of
objects as single entities in that unimodal representations of an
8While temporal synchrony can be regarded as the standard account, also other
accounts have been proposed; cf. Cleeremans (2003).
TABLE 1 | Functional organization of unifunctional (SoA) and multifunctional (SA) integration.
Functional organization Organizational principle Implementation of behavior Type of consciousness
Unifunctional integration Hierarchy: binding Neuronal modules SoA: experiential, non-efficacious
Multifunctional integration Heterarchy: asymmetric reciprocity Neuronal operators SA: performative, efficacious
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external object are bound together into one coherent neural state
(Metzinger, 1995). In this view, conscious experience depends on
the integration of basic sensory modalities and therefore emerges
as an epiphenomenal higher-order process.
While the standard account of binding aims at binding
features derived from sensory perception, Pacherie uses the
underlying mechanism also for the integration of behavioral
functions, referring to it as efferent binding (Pacherie, 2008).
Based on the comparator model, a number of behavioral
functions can be identified in her framework:9
• Comparator function
• Prediction of a movement
• Feedback of a movement
• Awareness of an intention to move




Pacherie explains the sense of intentional causation as the result
of a comparison between the prediction and the feedback of
a movement and the subsequent binding of movement and
consequence. This type of efferent binding is also discussed as
intentional binding (Haggard, 2005, Moore and Obhi, 2012).
The sense of initiation results from binding the awareness of an
intention to move and an awareness of movement onset. The
sense of control depends on the comparison between desired,
predicted, and actual states of a motion.
The behavioral functions underlying these senses
which constitute SoA are mapped onto neural modules
(modularization) so that there are specific brain areas, so-called
neural correlates (of consciousness) (NCC) (Chalmers, 2000,
Kühn et al., 2013), which instantiate behavioral functions.
Thus, according to Pacherie’s model SoA is the result of the
integration of independent neural modules which implement
the corresponding behavioral functions. One example is the
supposed implementation of the comparator model by the
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) which concerns the comparison
of self-produced actions and their visual consequences, the
cerebellum which concerns discrepancies between predicted and
sensory consequences of actions and possibly the extrastriate
body area (EBA) of the visual association cortex regarding visuo-
motor incongruence (David et al., 2008). Accordingly, the sense
of intentional causation is supposed to result from the bound
(synchronized) activity of neural modules such as PPC, the
cerebellum and EBA for comparison and modules for prediction
and feedback processing which are possibly implemented by the
supplementary motor area (SMA) (Eccles, 1982, Pfurtscheller
et al., 2014). Resulting from the bound activities of neuronal
modules at the basic level of processing, SoA emerges at higher
levels of processing. The hierarchical binding of the behavioral
functions constitutes SoA as “phenomenal counterpart[s]”
9For the sake of simplicity and as the general mechanism of binding remains the
same, we do not further distinguish between non-sensory behavioral functions
which control motion or which entail sensory input related to motion such as
proprioceptive feedback. For the same reason, we also ignore the distinction
between awareness and experience of action.
(Pacherie, 2008, p. 193) which are epiphenomenally attached to
cybernetic control mechanisms10.
Considering the hierarchy of unifunctional integration (with
locomotory modules at the bottom and SoA at the top), it is the
temporal organization which renders SoA inefficacious. As the
neural modules work independently at the basic neuronal level,
SoA follows on their independent activities. SoA occurs only
after the proprioceptive loop has been closed as the comparator
model depends on the efferent neural signal as well as on the
afferent signal of consequential sensation of the intendedmotion.
Accordingly, the sense of intentional causation is not efficacious
as it relies on the afferent feedback of an actual motion11. The
same limitation holds for the sense of control which also relies
on actual states of a motion and therefore depends on the closed
proprioceptive loop. The remaining sense of initiation does not
rely on any afferent signal and therefore conveys the impression
to be a suitable candidate for efficacious action consciousness.
Yet, a patient can try to initiate motion even if no movement
onset occurs so that also the sense of initiation presupposes an
already initiated motion.
The temporal dependency on the closed proprioceptive
loop and therefore on the integration of independent neural
modules renders SoA a mere phenomenal counterpart of sub-
personal motor processes. As a purely experiential consciousness,
a phenomenal counterpart cannot play any efficacious role
because it merely follows on locomotory events instead of
effecting the latter. Moreover, SoA immediately vanishes once
the corresponding locomotory mechanisms are out of order as in
the case of patients with locomotive impairments. These findings
show that SA as efficacious action consciousness does not fall under
common experiential action consciousness such as SoA.
3.3. Subjective Agency as a Phenomenal
Performance
Regarding the results of robotic neurorehabilitation which
gave rise to identify SA (Section 2) and the exclusion of
SA from experiential action consciousness (Section 3.2), we
suggest a preliminary working definition of SA as phenomenal
performance. Accounts such as Chisholm (1966), O’Connor
(2000) argue for something like SA on a conceptual level. But
besides a certain conceptual plausibility, it is also important to fix
the conscious phenomena of action initiation in an empirically
verifiable manner12.
10The explanation of SoA in terms of phenomenal counterparts of cybernetic
processes could also be extended to the general explanatory conflict that the
explanandum (SoA) becomes superfluous in face of the explanans as cybernetic
processes do not necessarily imply any phenomenal experience of agency, cf.
Grüneberg (2013), chapter 5.
11Research on processes of action selection suggests that there is a prospective
generation of SoA which does not rely on afferent signals (feedback) (Chambon
et al., 2014). On the one hand, action selection should be regarded as preceding SA.
However, the authors suggest that this prospective generation merges fully in the
post-hoc experience of SoA, so that it is not obvious how the prospective generation
should be efficacious.
12The proposed account of SA might at a first glance be similar to O’Connors’
concept of agent causation (O’Connor, 2000) as in both cases the agent is
supposed to be the cause of her action. The most important difference is that the
phenomenality of SA refers to the real (embodied) agent and does not imply any
metaphysical foundation in terms of O’Connors’ agent.
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SA is consciousness of an action during its initiation and
therefore occurs previous to visible motor behavior. On the
one hand, SA, just as SoA, bears a certain qualitative state of
consciousness and phenomenal content (Nagel, 1974). The agent
brings to mind that she is about to move (e.g., to move to another
place by forward walking). In healthy agents, the volition just
passes by as the intended motion is immediately implemented.
If the motion requires efforts (e.g., walking uphill), the volition
is phenomenally stronger and includes exertion. And in case no
bodily motion occurs, the volition might even be stronger in
terms of futile attempts of initiation. On the other hand, SA is a
prospect of the intended motion. The phenomenal content of SA
is present in the very moment of initiation and not given after
its initiation. In the moment of initiation, one acts voluntarily
(e.g., starts to move to another place by forward walking) so
that the conscious content of SA is equal to the voluntary
initiation of that action and therefore comes as a “performance.”
Taking together the phenomenal (qualitative) presence of SA and
its performative content, we suggest the working definition of
phenomenal performance in order to describe SA as a distinct
type of efficacious action consciousness. In contrast, SoA is
bound to intentional objects of experience (here aspects of motor
behavior) and therefore relates to already executed acts. It can be
characterized as a phenomenal representation of motor behavior.
In sum, the rehabilitation scenario yields particular evidence
for SA in that the patient can make efforts to move consciously
comparably with the conscious modification of thought or
behavior during cognitive-behavioral therapy. Even if the
patient’s efforts to move do not result in anymotion, SA still bears
a phenomenally present performative act, and the corresponding
neural signal occurs. Thus, even in the case of locomotory
impairment, SA is still efficacious in releasing an efferent neural
signal. But SA does not necessarily imply an awareness that one
acts in terms of the action as an intentional object of experience as
spelled out by SoA. Regarding the robotic rehabilitation scenario,
SoA also plays an important role after motion has been initiated
and implemented with the help of the robot. The patient receives
different kinds of feedback, such as proprioceptive and visual
feedback of her ownmotion. This information is also supposed to
play an important role in the process of rehabilitation (Kawamoto
et al., 2013). Thus, there are different types of experientially based
consciousness of one’s action, as SoA shows. But this phenomenal
representation has to be distinguished from SA as a phenomenal
performance.
4. Multifunctional Integration and
Subjective Agency
Hitherto, SA has been, firstly, identified as efficacious action
consciousness (Section 2) which does, secondly, not fall under
experiential action consciousness and comes as phenomenal
performance (Section 3). As unifunctional integration or binding
is not sufficient to explain SA’s efficacy, the question arises
as to what is needed in order to explain SA as efficacious
and therefore immediate (instead of epiphenomenally attached)
action consciousness. In the following, we will present a
multifunctional approach to SA which could also be adapted for
voluntary control of thought or combinations of thought and
behavior as in cognitive-behavioral therapy. For this purpose,
we will argue that the brain should be conceived in a way
that allows the neural implementation of SA (Section 4.1).
Then we suggest a functional organization of SA in terms
of multifunctional integration (Section 4.2) and some general
hypothesis on neurorehabilitation following SA (Section 4.3).
4.1. Not Underestimating the Brain
Whereas it should be the task of any scientific research about
consciousness to explain what actually occurs in our conscious
life, the current situation literally seems to have reversed. Instead
of finding a conception of the brain which suffices for obvious
phenomena such as SA, the latter are generally refuted by the
prevailing conception of the brain as a representational device
(cf. also Section 3.1). Hence, the situation arises that an obvious
phenomenon such as SA is not allowed to be a conscious and
efficacious phenomenon at the same time. This problem of
recognizing SA stems from the underlying assumption of what
the brain is capable of. If consciousness and cognition, as shown
in Section 3.2, are supposed to result from neurocomputational
brain processes, then the former can only achieve what the latter
allow for. This bias excludes conscious processes from being
efficacious regarding bodily action.
From a biological perspective Latash is making the same
point when he explains that a biological system as the brain
is explained in cybernetic terms which have originally been
developed for much less complex systems such as the control of
missiles (Latash, 2008, p. 323). In face of fundamental limitations
of representational and information-theoretic explanations of
consciousness (Eimer, 1990, Grüneberg, 2013), an analog point
can be made here. Information-processing, which is mainly
inspired by computational approaches and lies at the ground of
neuroscientific approaches to cognition and behavior, does not
capture complex intelligent behavior such as SA. Accordingly,
from the viewpoint of SA, the fundamental questions arises why
consciousness should necessarily and exclusively be experiential
(post-hoc) and, subsequently, how to extend our understanding of
the brain in order to include SA. As well as SA as multifunctional
integration and in general the idea of multimodality, the
concept of plasticity can be seen as another striking example
that sticking to a certain conception of the brain avoids the
recognition of its capabilities (Rubin, 2011). So it is important
to continuously question the explanatory framework underlying
the brain (Perruchet and Poulin-Charronnat, 2012).
4.2. Functional Organization of Subjective
Agency
Analogous to the functional analysis of SoA in Section 3.2,
the functional organization of SA will be clarified in terms of
the organizational principle, the implementation of behavioral
functions (Section 4.2.1) and the resulting type of consciousness
(Section 4.2.2; cf. Table 1).
4.2.1. Heterarchy: Asymmetric Reciprocity
SA comprises the behavioral functions of voluntary initiation and
the respective motor programs. Both can be distinguished as both
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can be performed independently of each other. While initiation
can refer to other behavioral patterns such as cognitive behavior
(Bayne and Montague, 2011), motor programs can also be
initiated automatically without any contribution by the conscious
agent. However, in case of SA both are integrated in a way that
makes SA an efficacious action consciousness so that hierarchical
binding with motor behavior at the basic level (as in case of SoA)
is not any more feasible. Instead, we draw on the heterarchic
principle of asymmetric reciprocity (Grüneberg, 2013, ch. 7, 8,
Grüneberg and Suzuki, 2014) in order to explain the integration
underlying SA. The general idea of asymmetric reciprocity is
that action consciousness depends on a bidirectional relation of
voluntary and automatic behavior with the former prevailing
the latter. Such a bidirectional and asymmetric relation is what
McCulloch (1945) and Günther (1971) call a heterarchy. A
heterarchic relation allows for the simultaneous and therefore
reciprocal activity of independent elements in a network so
that behavioral functions are implemented reciprocally and
at the same level of neuronal processing. At the same time,
the heterarchic relation allows for one element governing
other elements in that it includes a hierarchic and therefore
asymmetric moment. In contrast to a strictly hierarchic setup
where the governing element is predetermined by the hierarchy,
the governing element in a heterarchy can change depending on
the situation.
From this viewpoint, initiation as voluntary behavior and
motor programs as automatic behavior asymmetrically depend
on each other for the sake of SA. On the one hand, SA depends
in two respects on motor programs. Firstly, if the agent wants
to initiate a movement, the agent must be able to access her
actuators. This job is done by motor programs (Ivanenko et al.,
2004, Lacquaniti et al., 2012) which activate the locomotor
system on a synergetic level (Latash et al., 2007). Voluntary
behavior is enabled in that a voluntarily initiated motion is
automatically executed after its initiation so that, for example,
the agent can turn her attention to other tasks (Gallagher, 2006).
Thus, automatic motion is not a contradiction to voluntary
initiation, but the latter builds on automatic motor resources
which comprise learned and habituated motor behavior and
allow for new motor behavior. Secondly, if the agent selected
a certain motor program, she is constrained to the respective
motion and will move correspondingly. Even if she immediately
modifies her motion by selecting a different motor program,
every act of initiation is bound to its previous selection. Thus,
any selection depends on the currently running motor program.
Regarding the dependency of motor programs, a selection out
of the pool of available motor programs is necessary in order
to allow for coordinated (goal-directed) motion. Without a
selection, no movement would occur. Thus, motor programs
ask for a controlling instance. While this selection is often
done by automatic selection, SA shows that this selection can
also be done by the agent’s voluntary initiation. According to
this mutual dependency, initiation and motor programs are
organized reciprocally13. At the same time, the selection of a
13Analogously, Chalmers et al. argue that so-called higher-order (conceptual) and
lower-order (perceptual) processes necessarily depend on each other and thereby
specific motor program, i.e., the efficacy of initiation, implies
an asymmetric relation in that initiation releases one specific
motor program. In case of SA, the prevalence is in favor of the
voluntary initiation with the motor program being selected so
that initiation and motor programs are organized by asymmetric
reciprocity.
Regarding SA as action consciousness, we suggest that its
conscious appearance depends on asymmetric reciprocity.
Generally, the content of phenomenal consciousness
comprises particular objects. The main feature of phenomenal
consciousness is the persistence and homogeneity of those
objects—may these be physical objects externally perceived
or cognitive contents such as thoughts, intentions or inner
images. All these objects are characterized by the fundamental
feature that they form homogeneous entities which can be
distinguished from other entities and therefore identified as
single entities (Metzinger, 2003). Analogous to the problem of
experiential consciousness how objects composed of different
features and mediated by different sensory modalities can appear
phenomenally as homogeneous and therefore distinguishable
objects, action consciousness faces the problem how the
performing agent can distinguish between different behaviors
so that these can become identifiable contents of phenomenal
consciousness. Regarding SA, the question is how the agent can
distinguish between her voluntary initiation and the initiated
automatic motor program so that both become identifiable
phenomenal contents.
We suggest that this can be done by means of asymmetric
reciprocity. (It has to be noted that we are here in the
first place concerned with asymmetric reciprocity as the basic
organizational principle for the implementation of subjectivity
(Grüneberg and Suzuki, 2014). Phenomenal consciousness
(whether experiential or performative) as a particular instance of
subjectivity asks for further relational processing which is figured
out in more detail in Grüneberg, 2013, ch. 8). Take again the
case of SA of forward gait. According to reciprocity, voluntary
initiation and the motor program for forward gait mutually
depend on each other and are implemented simultaneously so
that they are contents of the same phenomenal state. At the
same time, the voluntary behavior (that the agent seeks to
walk forward) and the selection of the corresponding movement
depends on the agent’s self-determination (it is up to the agent
how to behave). In turn, the content of the automatic behavior
itself is pre-determined because a certain motor-program implies
one particular motion (here forward gait). According to this
asymmetry, both behaviors can be distinguished from each
other in that the voluntary behavior (initiation) becomes
distinguished as voluntary from automatic behavior (forward
gait) as automatic. Voluntary initiation and the automatic motor
program for forward gait can therefore be identified as particular
phenomenal contents of one and the same state, i.e., SA of
forward gait. It is this mutual distinction between voluntary and
show that alleged high-level or subjective cognition is already at play in so-called
low-level cognition (Chalmers et al., 1992). The same counts here in that locomotor
processes involve subjective selection processes.
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automatic behavior that distinguishes both behaviors from each
other and allows for SA becoming conscious.
SA is also efficacious as the phenomenal content of SA
is no other than voluntary initiation of a motor program.
The conscious act does not refer to any higher-order or
epiphenomenal level as in the case of SoA where the content
of agentive consciousness (the phenomenal state) is different
from the underlying behavioral functions (the object of that
state) and therefore cannot bear any efficacy. For example
while the sense of control, the object of experience, comprises
the comparison between desired, predicted and actual states,
it appears phenomenally as the feeling that one is in control
of an action (Pacherie, 2008). In case of SA, the phenomenal
performance can be directly identified with voluntary initiation
of a motor program so that SA can be efficacious and conscious
at the same time.
In the therapeutic scenario of neurorehabilitation (or
cognitive-behavioral therapy), SA clearly prevails motor
behavior. However, the same behavioral functions could also
be arranged differently. Another scenario might include the
ongoing walkingmotion while the agent is having a conversation.
In this latter scenario, the motor behavior is not being prevailed
by SA but performs automatically without being consciously
initiated compared to the rehabilitation scenario. The automatic
execution allows an agent to focus on other tasks such as motion
related aspects (e.g., navigation) or tasks completely distinct from
motion (e.g., conversation or observation of the environment
during walking). Therefore, if motor behavior is not initiated
voluntarily but performs automatically or is not performed by
the agent at all, this behavior is not conscious as there is no
mutual distinction with any voluntary behavior. It depends on
a particular situation which kind of functional behaviors are
implemented reciprocally so that a phenomenal performance
such as SA might arise.
4.2.2. Multifunctional Integration: Operators Sharing
Functions
According to modularization, behavioral functions are
implemented by independent neural modules so that the
integration of several functions follows after each independent
function has been activated. Therefore, unifunctional integration
depending on binding comes as a secondary integration. In
contrast, SA asks for a primary integration of behavioral
functions, i.e., the behavioral functions have to be immediately
activated as integrated functions. Such a heterarchy cannot be
facilitated by unimodal (secondary) integration. For this reason,
we argue that SA requiresmultifunctional integration.
In the following, we refer to the concept of the operator in
order to neurally implement SA as multifunctional behavior.
This means that both voluntary initiation and the motor
programs have to be implemented at the same basic neuronal
level. After identifying what Bassin et al. (based on the works
of Bernstein) called “neuronal polysensority” (Latash et al.,
2000, p. 13614), they proposed the concept of an operator in
14The cited paper is a translated reprint (Latash et al., 1999, Latash et al., 2000) of
Bassin et al. (1966) which was originally published in Russian language.
order to describe the modular (basic functional) units of the
brain. Derived from control theory, an operator designates
the particular design of a neuronal net which fulfills a specific
operation in the neurodynamic processes of a brain region
(Isomura et al., 2009). These operators can implement different
behavioral functions and therefore come as the independent
units of neural processing. For example, there are operators
(neural circuits) that perform mathematical or action-related
operations which can be shared by different functions (Latash,
2008) such as action planning, action initiation or learning. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to identify particular neuronal
operators. But, regarding SA, it can be suggested that there
should be operators for the decision for, selection and release of
a motor program which implement voluntary initiation. Neural
circuits in the SMA and the insula might be possible candidates
for implementing these operators (Eccles, 1982, Pfurtscheller
et al., 2014). Other operators would comprise synergistic
components which implement motor programs (Latash,
2008)15. In contrast to unimodal integration, multifunctional
integration implies that behavioral functions are not directly
(one-to-one) implemented by neural modules so that each single
function has to be activated independently and then integrated.
Instead, multifunctional operators implement behavioral
functions simultaneously as integrated functions in that single
functions are only realized reciprocally and in the context of
a comprehensive multifunctional behavior such as SA. Due to
their multimodal/-functional operationality, operators allow
for a primary and therefore multiple integration of behavioral
functions.
Multifunctionality also implies that SA is a non-localizable
function. There is no rigid modularization on the neural level
according to which SA could be attributed to a NCC. Building
on operators, there are not only several brain areas involved in
SA but also the spinal cord16 so that SA as a behavioral function
is attributed to the entire agent as an embodied and conscious
entity.
In sum, the functional organization of SA as a multifunctional
setup resolves shortcomings of unifunctional integration
of action consciousness. As SoA merely covers post-
hoc experience and therefore neglects the efficacious
nature of SA, the organization of the brain should be
modified to that extent that phenomenal performance
as an efficacious capacity can be implemented. For this
purpose, we suggest the heterarchic relation of asymmetric
reciprocity as the organizational principle and neural
operators as the implementation of the functional organization
of SA.
15Downward causation might serve as a comprehensive framework of the neural
implementation of SA (Murphy et al., 2009).
16Control of movement roughly involves the spinal cord and brainstem
circuits (lower motor neurons), the motor cortex and brainstem centers
(upper motor neurons), the cerebellum and the basal ganglia (Purves et al.,
2011). Depending on lower motor neurons and the generation of synergies
in the spinal cord by central pattern generators (Grillner and Wallen, 1985),
the neural control of movement encompasses the entire central nervous
system.
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4.3. Improving Neurorehabilitation by Utilizing
Subjective Agency
Currently, discussions on neurorehabilitation center around
whether an active or passive approach is more effective (Belda-
Lois et al., 2011). This issue concerns the degree to which a
patient’s active participation is required in order to activate and
control the therapeutic device (cf. Section 2). A related issue
concerns neurorehabilitation as a form of motor learning (Huang
and Krakauer, 2009, Kitago and Krakauer, 2013). Whereas
motor learning approaches also consider the effect of active
participation in terms of initiation of a movement by the patient,
they mainly focus on the ongoing execution of a movement and
the subsequent learning effects.
From the viewpoint of SA, an active approach which
stresses the importance of voluntary initiation compared to
the execution of a movement is advocated. This leads to
the following hypothesis: (1.) Effects of neurorehabilitation are
significantly increased by voluntary initiation which (2.) enables
motor learning. Regarding the neuronal dynamics, SA initiates
the proprioceptive loop so that the patient executes motor
programs successfully (cf. Section 2). This effect builds on the
multifunctional integration of SA according to which voluntary
initiation directly activates motor programs. Accordingly, a
patient can initiate movement comparable to a healthy condition
(Section 4) so that an active approach to neurorehabilitation
is supposed to be more effective than a passive approach
because the active rehabilitation entails activation of the entire
processes related to the intended movement whereas the passive
rehabilitation incorporates solely local processes that are directly
related to the treated joints. Furthermore, utilizing SA in
supervised and unsupervised learning scenarios with robotic
devices, a patient will receive proprioceptive feedback regardless
whether the trained movement was successful or asks for further
improvement. This allows a patient to enter into a learning
process even if execution of movements is limited. Thus, SA
also comprises enabling conditions for motor learning so that
voluntary initiation should be emphasized compared to motor
learning which performs often automatically once a motion
has been initiated. Both parts of the hypothesis can be tested
within the robotic framework presented in Section 5 as there is
also behavioral evidence for the efficacy of neurorehabilitation
initiated by SA (Section 5.2).
5. Experimental Evidence for Subjective
Agency
5.1. Robotic Case Study: Exoskeleton Robot HAL
For the purpose of illustrating SA, we will present the exoskeleton
robot HAL (hybrid assistive limb) (Sankai, 2006, Sankai, 2011)
which is used for gait rehabilitation of spinal cord injury and
stroke patients who suffer from severe impairments of motion
(cf. Figures 2, 3). Currently HAL supports straightforward
walking, standing up and sitting down. As different clinical
studies show, HAL has successfully supported rehabilitation
of 16 stroke patients (Kawamoto et al., 2013), 32 patients
with stroke, SCI, muscoskeletal and other diseases (Kubota
FIGURE 2 | Patient wearing HAL in a walking device (front view).
FIGURE 3 | Patient wearing HAL in a walking device (side view).
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et al., 2013), and one patient with ossification of the posterior
longitudinal ligament (OPLL) (Sakakima et al., 2013). Compared
to mechanically based exoskeleton robots which facilitate passive
support17, HAL makes use of biosignals and facilitates active
support.
Drawing on the proprioceptive loop (cf. Figure 1 and Section
2.2), HAL’s functionality can be described as follows: After the
patient has been equipped with HAL, she voluntarily initiates
a motor program for forward walking. HAL’s crucial feature
consists of EMG sensors attached to the flexor and extensor
muscles of hip and knee. By means of this sensors, HAL detects
the efferent active neural signal released by SA. In case there
remains enough neural activity in the legmuscles, HAL interprets
the neural impulse from the brain as a command to support
walking motion and generates torque so that leg movement
is facilitated. An afferent signal of consequential sensation is
reported back to the brain and closes the proprioceptive loop and
thereby supports neurorehabilitation. Thus, the patient initiates
HAL’s online gait support so that HAL is able to close the
proprioceptive loop by estimating the patient’s intention to move
(Suzuki et al., 2007). Without HAL these patients are not able to
initiate the physical gait motion efficaciously. The motor program
is indeed issued, but not actually implemented. The fact that
with HAL they are able to move implies that patients are able
to initiate sub-personal motor-processes consciously by means of
their SA.
In sum, theHAL scenario illustrates how SA is implemented as
multifunctional behavior depending on asymmetric reciprocity.
Voluntary initiation is directly bound to motor programs for
forward gait in that the patient seeks to walk forward. Reversely,
motor programs for forward gait are only initiated due to the
agents conscious efforts to walk forward. Thus, in that both
behavioral functions are activated simultaneously with voluntary
initiation governing the selection of motor programs, SA is
multifunctionally integrated and comes as efficacious action
consciousness.
5.2. Testable Hypotheses Building on Subjective
Agency
There are two possible areas where SA leads to testable
hypotheses. One concerns neurorehabilitation by means of
robotic devices. For the purpose of robotic neurorehabilitation,
two different approaches are pursued as described in Section 2.
On the one hand, patients use robots which build on the
physiological signals of the patients motion. As these signals
directly represent the intended motion, patients with locomotor
impairments are enabled to initiate motion voluntarily (by
themselves) while using a robot device. On the other hand,
exercise is done by passive motion in that a therapist or a
robot moves the patients limbs or body irrespective of motion
initiation by the patient. In case that the human locomotor
system would not allow for SA but only for SoA, therapeutic
outcome of these two kinds of therapy would make no significant
difference.
17Examples include Lokomat (Colombo et al., 2000), ALEX (Banala et al., 2009) or
AutoAmbulator (Fisher et al., 2011).
There are some reports on the importance of participants
efforts to initiate motion (Hogan et al., 2006; Eitam et al.,
2013) during motor learning (Lotze, 2003) or hand rehabilitation
(Takahashi et al., 2008) as well as the examples of the lower-
limb exoskeleton robot that we discussed in the previous sections.
Future analysis of the outcome of robotic rehabilitation could
investigate the differences between the two approaches in a
more evidence based manner. A testable hypothesis concerns
the extent of rehabilitative effects. In case of SA, reflecting its
characteristics as whole body phenomenal performance, whole
body coordination including stability, efficiency in multiple
muscle coordination, limb synergies and head/posture control
during locomotion is improved while in the case of SoA only
limb joint motion might be improved. This difference can be
physically evaluated by means of motion measurement and
analysis technology using 3D motion tracker and EMG sensors
in addition to the conventional 10m walking speed test and by
applying gait analysis methods which are commonly used in the
field of behavioral science.
The other area concerns conscious initiation of motion
and online control. Based on the functional organization of
SA, experiments should focus on the link between voluntary
initiation and motor programs as SA plays a major role in the
selection of a single motion out of a pool of available motions. Of
particular interest is the question how phenomenal performance
controls motor programs, i.e., how an agent can shape her motor
behavior by means of initiation and online control. In case
of athletes, motion in competitive contexts entails a variety of
extraordinarily rapid movements so that feed-forward control
of motion is widely exploited whereas feedback control might
be too slow to be included. Here, it should be considered to
test conscious self-recognition of motion. In case of SoA, self-
recognition reflects the conducted motion since SoA depends
on the perception of represented motion. In case of SA, self-
recognitionmight be rather different from the actually conducted
motion. Considering that an athlete by means of SA might have
learned an appropriate way of tricking sub-personal locomotor
processes through training, she might in some situations be
able to manipulate sub-personal processes much more effectively
for better performance than by sending naive straight forward
commands. Thus, the subsequent hypothesis states that there
are subjective motoric behaviors which allow for a goal-directed
manipulation of motion.
To test this hypothesis, motion measurement technology
can be used again. First athletes are interviewed how they
control motion and what is the key variable to control for
example the height of a jump and the angle of rotation
during turning in their specialized sports motion. Then we can
compare their self-recognition of the motion to the physically
measured motion. Differences between these two measurements
can support the existence and efficacy of SA. Predictions include
that SA concerns the global synergetic level of motion and
rather not kinematic and kinetic details of motion. Moreover,
the conscious access to or initiation of motion is supposed
to contain highly subjective motoric behaviors which are
not necessarily observed in objective kinetic and kinematic
measurements.
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6. Conclusion
Robotic rehabilitation yields evidence that there is action
consciousness prior to conducted motion. A similar finding can
also be derived from cognitive-behavioral therapy where the
voluntary involvement of the patient does also form an essential
part of the therapeutic process. Based on this evidence, we
argued for SA in terms of voluntary initiation of motor programs
for movement. By analyzing robotic neurorehabilitation and
introducing the proprioceptive loop, it could be concluded that,
firstly, SA as an efficacious conscious act does exist. Secondly,
we distinguished SA from common action consciousness by
means of an analysis of the functional organization of SoA
that showed that SoA depends on unifunctional binding which
inevitably leads to post-hoc and therefore inefficacious action
consciousness. Because SoA is implemented by independent
neural modules corresponding to the behavioral functions,
consciousness emerges not until the functions are integrated
(bound) and therefore beyond functional efficacy. Therefore, SA
implies a different type of action consciousness and has been
identified as a phenomenal performance: a conscious act which
consists of voluntarily initiating motor behavior.
For the sake of implementing SA, we suggested
multifunctional integration of the behavioral functions
underlying SA. Drawing on the heterarchic principle of
asymmetric reciprocity, voluntary initiation andmotor programs
can be integrated at the same neuronal level simultaneously
with the prevalence of initiation. We argued that it is the
mutual distinction between voluntary and automatic behavior
that allows for SA becoming conscious. Regarding the neural
implementation of SA, we referred to the concept of the
multifunctional operator which forms the basic neuronal module
and is shared by different functions so that the activation of
behavioral functions goes hand in hand with their integration.
This means that the behavioral functions are not implemented
independently as modules and then possibly integrated,
but immediately integrated at the time of their activation.
The multifunctional integration makes SA conscious with
functional efficacy. Finally, we presented a robotic case study as
experimental evidence for SA and sketched experimental setups
of neurorehabilitation and athletic motion control in order to
gain behavioral evidence for SA.
In sum, we propose that there is the phenomenal performance
of SA as a type of efficacious action consciousness. Our analysis
showed that an unifunctional approach to the brain is too
narrow in order to capture the complexity of human behavior.
Future research should seek to integrate multimodal input and
multifunctional behavior. For this purpose, research in bodily
motion forms an instructive starting point as movement implies
a broad range of sensory and behavioral processing which are
inherently integrated.
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